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The 1994 General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) ushered forth a new era in
global trade relations. Among other notable achievements, the Agreement established the
World Trade Organization (WT0), strengthened dispute settlement provisions, signiﬁcantly
reduced tariﬀs and export subsidies, and provided for the gradual elimination of import
quotas. Although many forms of trade protection have fallen under the 1994 Agreement,
antidumping protection has proven to be a noteworthy exception. Thirty-one countries im-
posed antidumping protection a total of 757 times in the ﬁve years following implementation
of the 1994 agreement, an 82.4 percent increase in the number of imposing countries and
a 43.6 percent increase in the number of antidumping measures imposed compared to the
previous ﬁve years.1
Under the WTO Antidumping Agreement (the Agreement), countries may protect their
domestic industries by imposing additional imports duties on speciﬁc products if the country
ﬁnds these products have been dumped, or sold below a “normal” value.2 Before imposing
antidumping duties, the country must undertake an investigation to (1) prove that dumping
is taking place and calculate the extent of this dumping and (2) prove that the dumping is
causing or threatening to cause “material injury” to the domestic industry.
Although the Agreement speciﬁes a number of rules that must be adhered to during the
course of antidumping investigations, countries still have a great deal of latitude in how
they decide whether the dumping is causing material injury to the domestic industry. The
Agreement speciﬁes only that countries must consider all “relevant economic factors.” The
increasing number of trade disputes that have arisen over antidumping duties suggests that
either the Agreement is not applied consistently across countries or countries are interpreting
1The number of antidumping investigations actually decreased in the ﬁve years following the agreement,
falling 3.2 percent to 1,198 investigations. Based on these statistics, antidumping investigations appear to be
more likely to result in protection following the 1994 Antidumping Agreement. For more detailed statistical
information, see Zanardi (2004).
2The normal value is typically deﬁned as the price set by the foreign producer in its domestic market,
although the agreement allows countries to exclude any prices made below the producer’s average cost of
production in this calculation of normal value. Thus, antidumping regulations target both predatory pricing
and price discrimination.
2the rules within the Agreement quite diﬀerently. Of the 334 disputes initiated at the WTO
between 1995 and 2005, nearly 17 percent involved antidumping investigations. WTO mem-
bers have agreed to consider reﬁnements to the Antidumping Agreement during the Doha
Round of trade negotiations, speciﬁcally to “clarify and improve...while preserving the basic,
concepts and principles of these agreements.”3
This research is one of the ﬁrst papers to explore country and industry speciﬁc dif-
ferences in the determinants of antidumping injury decisions. Using a random-coeﬃcients
probit model, I estimate the amount of variance in the marginal eﬀects of particular eco-
nomic and political characteristics on the probability of an aﬃrmative determination across
both countries and industries. I also investigate to what extent diﬀerences can be explained
by speciﬁc characteristics of the investigating country, particularly the country’s level of
development. The results indicate that there is a great deal of inconsistency in injury deci-
sions under the current WTO Antidumping Agreement. Countries appear to utilize a wide
variety of economic characteristics to make their injury determinations. For example, the
results suggest that the total volume of imports from the country under investigation has
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on injury determination in high-income countries but not
in developing countries. Similarly, it appears that the determinations of some countries are
more inﬂuenced by political factors then others.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section [2] provides a description
of the WTO’s antidumping agreement, particularly the provisions regulating how countries
must determine whether dumping has caused material injury to their domestic industries.
It then reviews the literature studying the economic and political determinants of injury
decisions in various countries. Section [3] describes the empirical methodology, and Section
[4] discusses the data used in this research. The ﬁnal two sections of the paper present the
empirical results and conclusions of the research.
2 Injury Determinations and the WTO
This section reviews both the history of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and previous
economic research on the outcome of antidumping investigations in an eﬀort to motivate the
32001 Doha Ministerial Declaration.
3empirical speciﬁcation and variables used in this study. Because this research compares injury
determinations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement across countries, the discussion
below focuses speciﬁcally on those aspects of the Antidumping Agreement which deal with
the determination of injury.
2.1 The Antidumping Agreement
Antidumping has a long history in the GATT, going back to the original GATT Agree-
ment of 1947. At that time, the GATT allowed countries to impose antidumping duties
as long as the country determined that the dumping was causing or threatening to cause
material injury to a domestic industry. Few countries used antidumping protection during
these earlier years, in part because tariﬀ levels were generally high enough to protect do-
mestic industries.4 As tariﬀ rates gradually decreased in the years following World War II,
countries slowly began to impose more antidumping protection. This increase in use led to
the completion of the ﬁrst Antidumping Agreement in 1967 as part of the Kennedy Round
of trade negotiations.
The Kennedy Round Antidumping Agreement required countries to demonstrate that
dumped imports were the principal cause of injury to the domestic industry prior to the
imposition of duties. It emphasized that countries must consider all other factors which may
be adversely aﬀecting the industry. The agreement was signiﬁcantly revised in 1979 under
the the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. Since that time injury determinations must be
based on (1) the volume of dumped imports, (2) the impact of these imports on prices in the
domestic market, and (3) the impact of these imports on domestic producers. The Uruguay
Round did not signiﬁcantly change the injury determination clauses of the Antidumping
Agreement, thus most of the regulations discussed below have been in place since 1979.
Under the Antidumping Agreement, investigating authorities must consider whether
there has been a signiﬁcant increase in dumped imports, price undercutting of the domestic
industry, and whether the imports either depress domestic prices or prevent price increases.
4The ﬁrst countries to use antidumping protection include Australia, Canada, the European Union, New
Zealand and the United States. However, use of antidumping laws was limited in the early years even in
these countries.
4Investigating authorities should consider a wide range of economic factors including actual
and potential decline in sales, proﬁts, output, market share, productivity, capacity utiliza-
tion and investments. Other economic factors that should be considered include cash ﬂow,
inventories, employment, wages, and growth. The authorities are directed to consider other
factors that may be causing injury to the domestic industry other than dumped imports.
Note that it is not enough to show that the domestic industry has been injured; the gov-
ernment must prove a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury or threat of
injury. The Agreement requires that the investigation be terminated if oﬃcials determine
that the volume of either actual or potential dumped imports is “negligible.”5
The only signiﬁcant change made to the injury provisions of the Antidumping Agree-
ment during the Uruguay Round was the inclusion of cumulation procedures. When the
investigating authority is considering the impact of imports from more than one country
simultaneously, the Agreement allows oﬃcials to cumulatively assess the eﬀects as long as
this cumulation is appropriate under the conditions of competition between the imported
products and the domestic producers. Such cumulation procedures had been part of both
the U.S. and EU antidumping regulations prior to inclusion in the Antidumping Agreement.
Note that although the injury provisions of the Antidumping Agreement did not change
signiﬁcantly under the Uruguay Round, the Uruguay Round did usher in major changes
in other aspects of antidumping regulations. For example, prior to the Uruguay Round
antidumping duties were imposed indeﬁnitely. Since 1994, countries have agreed to review
the imposition of antidumping duties every ﬁve years. The Uruguay Round also limited the
use of adverse facts in dumping margin determinations. Any or none of these changes could
have spurred the increase in antidumping protection since passage of the Uruguay Round.
Countries may be imposing more antidumping protection simply because other forms of
protection have gradually decreased under the Uruguay Round.
All signatories to the Antidumping Agreement have obviously agreed to adhere to the
above rules. However, implementation of these rules diﬀers signiﬁcantly across countries. For
example, while countries like the European Union and Australia rely upon a single agency
5The term negligible was undeﬁned until the Uruguay Round, at which time it was deﬁned as less than
three percent of imports of the product in the country.
5to determine both the dumping and injury determination, others like the United States and
Canada assign these decisions to two separate agencies. The degree of transparency in the
decision-making process also varies across countries, particularly the amount of economic
data released to both participating ﬁrms and the public at large.6 Antidumping regulations
in the EU require government oﬃcials to consider the impact of duties on end-users of the
product under investigation prior to imposing duties; other countries have no such provisions.
2.2 Injury Determinations Under the AD Agreement, 1995-2003
According to WTO statistics, WTO members initiated 2,436 antidumping investigations
between 1995 and 2003. These same members imposed antidumping measures in 1,522 inves-
tigations during this time period, suggesting that slightly over 60 percent of all antidumping
investigations eventually result in the imposition of duties.7 Although I only include the
outcomes of investigations initiated by twelve WTO members in this research, the sample
includes a large proportion of total worldwide antidumping activity.8 The twelve selected
countries initiated 1,861 investigations between 1995 and 2003, or slightly over three-quarters
of the total number of investigations by WTO members. These same twelve countries im-
posed 1,160 antidumping measures during this time period, suggesting that countries within
the sample are equally likely to impose antidumping duties following their investigations as
all WTO members.
Government oﬃcials made ﬁnal injury determinations in 1,673 of the 1,861 investigations
initiated by countries in the sample.9 Government oﬃcials made aﬃrmative determinations
in 68.9 percent of these injury investigations, ﬁnding that dumped imports from the country
under investigations were causing or threatening to cause material injury to the domestic
6Blonigen and Prusa (2003).
7Antidumping investigations typically take longer than one year; it is unlikely that all 2,436 investigations
initiated between 1995 and 2003 resulted in determinations during this same time period.
8The sample includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Korea,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and the United States.
9Note that this ﬁgure includes the negative injury determinations made in preliminary stages of investi-
gations that resulted in termination of investigations. Final injury determinations were unavailable for those
investigations that were withdrawn by the industry or terminated for reasons other than a negative injury
determination.
6industry.
This average outcome of injury determinations masks a great deal of heterogeneity in
the outcome of injury investigations across both countries and industries. As illustrated
in Figure [1], the percentage of investigations resulting in aﬃrmative injury determinations
varies signiﬁcantly across countries, ranging from a high of 87.6 percent in China to a low
of 35.8 percent in Australia. Similarly, the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination
appears to depend a great deal on the industry under investigation, as revealed in Table [1].
For example, while all of the antidumping investigations involving six of the industries in the
sample resulted in aﬃrmative injury determinations, none of the 24 investigations involving
the apparel sector resulted in an aﬃrmative injury determination.10
2.3 Literature Review
Research on the determinants of antidumping investigation outcomes has exploded with
the level of antidumping protection in the world. Much of this research tests the theoreti-
cal predictions of political economy models of trade policy by investigating to what degree
political factors inﬂuence government determinations during antidumping investigations. Al-
though a complete review of this literature is out of the scope of this paper, below is a brief
summary of the key results of earlier research, including a comparison of results across
countries.11
Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) provides the ﬁrst empirical evidence of the economic
determinants of antidumping investigation outcomes. The authors hypothesize that injury
determinations are more likely to be inﬂuenced by political factors than the dumping margin
determinations because while regulations governing dumping margin determinations specify
the methodologies that should be used to make these calculations, regulations are less speciﬁc
as to how injury determinations should be made. Using a sample of outcomes from nearly
300 investigations between 1980 through 1987 in the United States, the authors ﬁnd some
evidence to support this conclusion. Speciﬁcally, such characteristics as the size of the
10An industry is deﬁned by its three digit International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) Rev. 2
number.
11Both Nelson (forthcoming) and Blonigen and Prusa (2003) provide detailed overviews of the current
state of research on antidumping.
7industry (as measured by total employment) signiﬁcantly impact the injury determination
but not the dumping margin determination.
Most research on this topic since Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) utilize similar techniques
to study the inﬂuence of political factors on antidumping injury determinations. Typically
researchers in this ﬁeld estimate a probit regression in which the dependent variable equals
one if the government makes an aﬃrmative injury determination, thus resulting in the im-
position of antidumping duties. Although the papers diﬀer in the data and variables used,
many reach similar conclusions. For example, virtually all research in this area has found
that the economic characteristics of industries signiﬁcantly inﬂuence injury determinations.
However, papers that use highly disaggregated data from actual investigation reports such
as Moore (1992) and Devault (1993) typically ﬁnd a stronger correlation between economic
characteristics and the injury determination than those that use more aggregated data such
as Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) and Hansen and Prusa (1996, 1997).12 Economic char-
acteristics that typically prove to be important include the volume of imports and proﬁt or
output loss in the domestic industry.
Research on the determinants of injury decisions, including Devault (2001), Hansen
(1990) and Sabry (2000), also typically ﬁnd that political factors, such as the size of the
industry and the amount of political monetary contributions made by the industry, can in-
ﬂuence determinations. Although all of the paper described above utilize U.S. investigation
data, Eymann and Schuknecht (1996) reaches similar conclusions for the European Union.
As discovered in such papers as Hansen and Prusa (1996, 1997), political pressure may take
the form of bias against certain trading partners. For example, Hansen and Prusa ﬁnd that
U.S. cases against western European countries are more likely to result in negative injury
determinations than U.S. cases against Japan and non-market economies such as China.
Other research has found that certain antidumping regulations can have a dramatic
impact on investigation outcomes. Hansen and Prusa (1996) investigate the 1985 change in
U.S. antidumping law that allowed for the cumulation of imports from all targeted countries
12Countries may not release the disaggregated data from some antidumping investigations in order to
preserve the conﬁdentiality of the domestic ﬁrms taking part in the investigation. As a result, research that
uses disaggregated data must rely on a much smaller number of observations.
8when making the injury determination. They ﬁnd that cumulated cases are approximately
30 percent more likely to result in duties than non-cumulated cases. Tharakan, Greenway,
and Tharakan (1998) ﬁnd similar results when investigating the impact of cumulation on
European injury decisions. Both papers suggest that the increase in protection following the
inclusion of cumulation procedures in antidumping regulations is not just due to the actual
law change, but that government agencies actually became more protective following the
change in law.
Although not speciﬁed in regulations, Feaver and Wilson (1998) argue that the Australian
Antidumping Authority makes decisions in a bifurcated approach–ﬁrst deciding whether the
domestic industry has suﬀered material injury and then whether dumped imports caused said
injury. The authors empirically estimate the determinants of only the material injury decision
and ﬁnd that economic factors, including whether there was evidence that domestic prices
had been suppressed or whether the industry experienced a decline in capacity utilization,
played a much larger role in the material injury decision than suggested by earlier studies
of the U.S. and European injury determinations. However, the authors could not reject
the hypothesis that there was a protectionist bias in Australian decisions. Devault (1993)
similarly models a bifurcated decision-making process in the United States and ﬁnds that
the two-stage process signiﬁcantly impacts results. Speciﬁcally, by estimating a two-stage
decision making process Devault ﬁnds that antidumping protection is oﬀered only to those
industries with negative proﬁts, not those with lower proﬁts.
As can be seen from the list above, most research on antidumping investigation outcomes
speciﬁcally studies cases in the United States, although some research has been done on out-
comes in the European Union and Australia. In contrast, little research has been done on
injury determinations in new users of antidumping, particularly developing countries. Fran-
cois and Niels (2004) examines the role that political factors play in Mexico’s antidumping
determinations. Similar to the studies discussed above involving the United States and Euro-
pean Union, the authors ﬁnd that political factors such as the size and level of concentration
of the industry signiﬁcantly impact the outcome of antidumping determinations. Mexico is
also more likely to impose dumping margins on non-WTO members and countries which
have imposed antidumping duties against Mexican ﬁrms in the past. Bown (2006) exam-
9ines the success of antidumping investigations in nine developing countries and ﬁnds that
countries are more likely to award antidumping protection to larger (as measured by the
value of output) and more capital intensive industries.13 In this study, Bown accounts for
country- and industry-speciﬁc diﬀerences in antidumping petition outcomes using country
and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
With the exception of Bown (2006), all of the research above studies antidumping in-
vestigation outcomes from the perspective of a single country. In contrast, Tharakan and
Waelbroeck (1994) argues that although the EU and U.S. system are similar, diﬀerences in
regulations and procedures make the EU system more susceptible than the United States to
political inﬂuences. Speciﬁcally, the EU limits the antidumping duty to the level that would
eliminate the injury to the domestic industry, rather than the full dumping margin, which
places more emphasis on the injury determination. They also argue that the methods used
by the EU to make determinations were less sophisticated than those used by the United
States, and that the lack of transparency of the EU system makes aﬃrmative injury determi-
nations more likely.14 Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) replicate a model similar to Finger,
Hall, and Nelson (1982), then compare the results to the original U.S. research to compare
outcomes in the two countries. The authors conclude that political factors are important
determinants of injury decisions in the European Union like in the United States, although
there are diﬀerences in the particular variables that prove signiﬁcant in the outcomes in the
two country’s antidumping regimes.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
This research builds upon work by Bown (2006) and Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994)
by exploring cross-country diﬀerences in the determinants of antidumping injury decisions.
This section describes a model of decision-making in antidumping injury investigations that
allows the determinants of the decisions to vary across both countries and industries.
13Bown (2006) hypothesizes that capital-intensive industries tend to have higher ﬁxed costs and, thus, are
more likely to face cyclical dumping than other industries.
14Speciﬁcally, the EU fails to release business conﬁdential information to the foreign defendants in the
antidumping investigation.
10Oﬃcials in country c must decide whether or not to make an aﬃrmative injury deter-
mination in each of the P antidumping investigations initiated by industry i between 1995
and 2003. Although all countries must abide by the WTO Antidumping Agreement, each
country interprets the WTO regulations diﬀerently. Oﬃcials within the country also abide
by idiosyncratic domestic regulations. As illustrated in Table [1], the proportion of investi-
gations in which oﬃcials make aﬃrmative injury determinations diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
industries. It is unclear whether this diﬀerence is due to diﬀerences in the characteristics of
the industry themselves or diﬀerences in the way that government oﬃcials interpret these
characteristics. Therefore, I allow the parameters describing the determinants of the injury
decision to diﬀer across both countries and industries.15
Deﬁne y∗
cip as the propensity of oﬃcials in country c to make an aﬃrmative injury de-
termination in petition p ﬁled by industry i. As in a typical probit model, oﬃcials make an
aﬃrmative injury determination when this propensity is greater than zero, and a negative
determination otherwise. Mathematically, the injury determination can be expressed as:
y
∗




γci = γ + ∆wci + Γvci.
The dependent variable ycip equals one when oﬃcials make an aﬃrmative injury determina-
tion and zero otherwise. The propensity to make an aﬃrmative determination is a function
of a miriad of characteristics included in the vectors xcip and zcip. Oﬃcials in all countries
are assumed to place the same weight, β on the factors included in xcip. However, the impact
of the factors included in zcip on the ﬁnal injury determination, γci, are random and will de-
pend on both the country and industry ﬁling the antidumping petition. As indicated in the
expression above, the value of the random parameters will depend on a number of factors,
including: γ, a K1 by one vector of the average impact of zcip on the propensity to make an
aﬃrmative determination, where K1 is the number of variables in zcip; ∆, a K1 by K2 matrix
15I also need to make this assumption to empirically estimate the model. Observations are deﬁned as
groups with the same parameters. By allowing parameters to vary across both countries and industries, I
increase my sample size to 166 country-industry combinations compared to just 12 countries.
11of parameters that describe the impact of the K2 observed characteristics of industry i and
country c, wci, on the random parameters; vci, a K1 by one vector of mean zero random
variables; and Γ, a K1 by K1 lower triangular matrix of parameters. Speciﬁcally, Γ is the
Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix of the random parameters.16
The determinants of antidumping injury decisions can be estimated using a random-
coeﬃcients bivariate probit model.17 Using this speciﬁcation, the conditional probability of






ycip[1 − Φ(xcipβ + zcipγci)]
(1−ycip)f(γci|γ,∆,Γ,wci)∂γci
where Φ is the standard normal distribution. The likelihood contribution of the individual
country/industry is the product of this conditional probability over the P petitions ﬁled by
industry i in country c, while the likelihood function associated with the full sample is the







Estimation of Equation [1] is not feasible because the integral cannot be calculated ana-
lytically. The likelihood contribution of each country/industry combination must instead be
approximated using simulation, and the parameters estimated through maximum simulated













ycip[1 − Φ(xcipβ + zcipγcir)]
(1−ycip)]
γcir = γ + ∆wci + Γvcir
where γcir is the rth draw of γci from the underlying distribution of vci, and R is the total
number of simulated draws used in the estimation. In the results presented below, I simulate
the integral in Equation [1] using 125 draws from a Halton sequence. Research has shown
16In the results presented below, I assume that vci is normally distributed and that the covariance terms
of the random parameters are zero. In other words, I assume that Γ is a diagonal matrix, with the standard
deviation of vci on the diagonal.
17This model is sometimes refered to as a multilevel or mixed probit model.
12that simulation error with 125 draws from a Halton sequence of values is half as large as
with 1000 random draws.18
4 Data
The research would not have been possible without the recently completed Global An-
tidumping Database, which provides detailed data on all of the antidumping investigations
undertaken by 19 countries since 1980.19 The database includes such information as the
date of the initiation of the investigation, the date and outcome of the preliminary and ﬁnal
injury and dumping determinations, and the names of both the domestic and foreign ﬁrms
involved in the investigation.20
Ideally, any empirical investigation of the determinants of antidumping injury decisions
across countries would include as much of the speciﬁc information taken under consideration
by the investigating authorities as available, including those factors described in Section [2]
for the speciﬁc industry under investigation. Researchers studying the determinants of U.S.
injury investigations, including Moore (1992), have successfully collected such disaggregated
information from the public ﬁles associated with U.S. investigations. Unfortunately, the
global nature of this dataset, particularly the variation in the public release of information
across countries, makes it virtually impossible to collect such disaggregated data for this
project.
I instead seek to explain injury decisions in antidumping investigations across indus-
18Train (2003), page 231. Speciﬁcally, I draw K1, R by N sequences of Halton values, where N is the
total number of industry-country observations. The kth sequence of Halton values is calculated by deﬁning
k as kth prime number larger than 2. I expand the value of a sequence of integers in terms of base k as
g = ΣI
i=0biki. The corresponding gth value in the Halton sequence is deﬁned by Hk(g) = ΣI
i=1bik−i−1. This
sequence is eﬃciently spread over the unit interval. Based on my assumption that vci is normally distributed,
the kth element of vcir = Φ−1(Hk(cir)), where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal distribution.
19This database was collected by Chad Bown under a project funded by the World Bank. It is currently
available online at http://people.brandeis.edu/∼cbown/global ad/. See Bown (2006) for more information.
20I recoded some of the case outcomes from the Global Antidumping Database. For example, the Database
codes some investigations terminated due to negligible imports at “terminated.” Because the level of imports
is a key element in the injury determination, I recode these case outcomes as having a negative injury
determination.
13tries and countries using the more readily available data at more aggregated levels. To do
this, I ﬁrst assign each investigation to industries using the harmonized system (HS) trade
classiﬁcation numbers of the products under investigation as provided in the Global An-
tidumping Database. I match each investigation to a ﬁve-digit Standardized International
Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) (Rev. 2) industry using the concordance between HS and SITC
classiﬁcations developed by Feenstra (1996). Note that the HS numbers associated with a
particular investigation may correspond with more than one SITC industry. In this case,
I assign the investigation to the SITC industry which accounted for the largest value of
imports from the country under investigation in the year of the investigation. Using this
SITC classiﬁcation, I also assign each investigation to a three digit International Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) (Rev. 2) industry using the concordance developed by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Explanatory variables come from several sources. The probability of an aﬃrmative injury
determination should increase with the value of imports of the dumped product from the
country under investigation (Log (Imports)), as well as the proportion of imports of this
product from the country under investigation (Exporter’s Share of Imports). Intuitively, an
increase in either measure should increase the likelihood that the investigating authority will
ﬁnd that the dumped imports were the principal cause of injury to the domestic industry.
I calculate both measures using data from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics
Database, which provides import data at the ﬁve digit SITC (Rev. 2) level.
The probability of an aﬃrmative injury determination should be negatively correlated
with the domestic industry’s annual production growth because high levels of growth are
one indicator that the domestic industry has not suﬀered material injury due to the dumped
imports. I calculate the industry’s annual (Production Growth) using the “Index of In-
dustrial Production” reported at the three-digit ISIC level in the United Nation Industrial
14Development Organization’s (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics Database.21’22
As noted above, earlier studies have found that political factors can play a signiﬁcant
role in injury determinations. I use two alternative measures of the political strength of the
industry: the industry’s share of the importing country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(Industry’s Share of GDP) and the industry’s share of the importing country’s total em-
ployment (Industry’s Share of Employment). To calculate these shares, I use the three-digit
ISIC industry’s value-added and employment from the UNIDO Database. The International
Labor Organization’s Labor Force Survey provides total employment by country, and I use
real GDP data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.23
If political factors play a signiﬁcant role in antidumping determinations, I would expect the
impact of both variables to be positively correlated with the likelihood of an aﬃrmative
injury determination.
Although the import sensitivity of an industry may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the investigating
authority’s injury determination, it is unclear whether import sensitive industries are more or
less likely to be awarded antidumping protection. Typically, the more sensitive the industry,
the more likely it is to be awarded protection. However, if these industries have already
been awarded alternative forms of protection such as high protective tariﬀs then they are
less likely to request additional antidumping protection. I hypothesize that conditional on
requesting antidumping protection, the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination
should be positively correlated with the degree of import sensitivity of the industry because
the imports under investigation are more likely to cause material injury to highly sensitive
domestic industries. I measure the degree of import sensitivity with the average tariﬀ rate
21The UNIDO data reports this index with as much as a two to three year lag. In order to maximize my
data sample, I lag the Production Growth data by one year. In other words, I assume that the probability
of an aﬃrmative injury decision in a case ﬁled in 2000 is a function of the growth of the domestic industry
between 1998 and 1999. Countries must consider economic data during the entire period of investigation of
at least three years when making injury determinations.
22I calculate an index of industrial production for the European Union using a GDP-weighted average of
the reported index from member countries.
23Industry-speciﬁc data limitations prevent me from calculating these shares on an annual basis. Therefore,
for each country I measure the shares using data from the year in which the most industry-speciﬁc data is
available, which ranges from 1990 to 1995 depending on the country.
15in the industry (Tariﬀ ). Speciﬁcally, I utilize the average ad valorem tariﬀ rate reported for
the three-digit ISIC industry in the World Bank’s Trade and Production database in 1999.24
As indicated in Table [2], developing countries have much higher tariﬀ rates on average than
higher-income countries. Therefore, I also interact the tariﬀ rate variable with a dummy
variable that equals one if the importing country is a developing country.25
As noted in Section [2], some papers have discovered that political pressure may take
the form of bias against certain trading partners. I hypothesize that the likelihood of an
aﬃrmative injury decision may depend on the level of development of the country under
investigation, for several reasons. Industries within less-developed countries may be less
likely to successfully defend themselves during the course of the investigation due to a lack
of resources or knowledge. Countries may also be more likely to impose protection against
developing countries if developing countries are less able to retaliate against the importing
country.26 Both explanations suggest that the the level of development of the exporting
country should be negatively correlated with the probability of an aﬃrmative injury deter-
mination. I also include the level of development of the importing country as a possible
explanatory variable in an eﬀort to determine whether developing countries are more or less
likely to impose antidumping protection than higher income countries. To measure the level
of development in the exporting and importing country, I use the real GDP per capita from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Finally, I include several macroeconomic variables associated with the countries involved
in the investigation. Both Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2005) ﬁnd that countries
are more likely to ﬁle petitions following a real appreciation of a country’s currency or a fall in
24I speciﬁcally use the tariﬀ averages calculated from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. Annual tariﬀ rate
averages are unavailable for the full sample period. I choose to use data from 1999 because it is the mid-point
year in the sample period.
25I deﬁne developing countries as those with a real per capita GDP of less than $9,000. This value was
chosen to ensure that each importing country remained either a developing or high-income country for the
entire sample period.
26Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) ﬁnd that countries initiate many antidumping investigations in order to
retaliate against the antidumping measures imposed upon their exporters in the past. Thus, if a country is
unable to retaliate the investigating authority may feel free to impose antidumping protection without fear
of reprisal.
16the country’s GDP growth, at least in Australia, Canada, European Union, and the United
States. The authors hypothesize that both factors make it more likely that the government
will ﬁnd that the domestic industry has been injured by imports from the foreign country,
resulting in the imposition of antidumping duties. To account for these macroeconomic
determinants I include the log bilateral real exchange rate (Exchange Rate Change) and real
GDP growth in the investigating country (Importer’s GDP Growth) and exporting country
(Exporter’s GDP Growth).27 The real GDP growth rates are the two-year growth rates, or
the two year’s prior to the initiation of the investigation.
Because this research is particularly interested in the outcome of antidumping investiga-
tions since the passage of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, I limit my dataset to those
investigations between 1995 and 2003. The ﬁnal dataset includes 1,671 injury determina-
tions across 12 countries and 28 three-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industries.28 The distribution of
injury determinations across industries and countries is described in Figure [1] and Table
[1]. Summary statistics describing the dependent and explanatory variables are included in
Table [2].
5 Results
As noted in Revelt and Train (1996), the model becomes empirically diﬃcult to identify
when all coeﬃcients are allowed to vary in the population. When I allow all coeﬃcients to be
random, the model fails to converge within a reasonable number of iterations. Therefore, I
27I calculate the bilateral real exchange rate using nominal exchange rate data and consumer price indices
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. Each bilateral exchange rate is
normalized by dividing by the mean over 1995 to 2005 prior to taking logs. Thus a one percent appreciation
of the importer’s currency from the average rate over the period is expressed as 0.01. Real GDP data is
collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
28As noted above, the unit of observation in this research is an industry within a particular investigating
country. The likelihood contribution of the observation is the product of the probability of observing the
actual injury determinations in each of the petitions ﬁled by the industry between 1995 and 2003. For
example, the United States made injury determinations in 180 antidumping petitions ﬁled by the U.S. iron
and steel industry against between 1995 and 2003. The U.S. iron and steel industry is a single observation,
and the likelihood contribution of this observation is the product of the probability of observing each of the
actual injury determinations in the 180 investigations.
17choose which coeﬃcients to vary across the population by ﬁrst assuming that all coeﬃcients
are random, then dropping one random coeﬃcient at a time. I use likelihood ratio tests
to determine whether the inclusion of the random component to the coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly
improves the explanatory power of the model. Using this methodology, I determine that the
coeﬃcients on the importer’s GDP growth, log(imports), industry’s production growth, and
the industry’s share of GDP should be allowed to vary across countries and industries.
Parameter estimates from the random-coeﬃcients probit model are presented in Table
[4], while the marginal eﬀects associated with these estimates are included in Table [5].29 I
also report the coeﬃcient and marginal eﬀect estimates from a random-eﬀects probit model
in Table [3]. This model assumes that countries place the same weight on all of the factors
taken into consideration, essentially restricting the covariance matrix Γ to equal zero.30 In
speciﬁcation 1 of the random-coeﬃcients model the country-industry speciﬁc coeﬃcients are
deﬁned only by the mean value of the parameter, reported in column [1] of Table [4], and an
unobserved random component. The estimated standard errors of the random components
are reported in column [2]. The likelihood ratio statistic associated with the test that the
random-coeﬃcient probit model ﬁts the data better than the random-eﬀects probit model is
included in the ﬁnal row of Table [4]. Based on this test statistic, I reject the null hypothesis
that the variance on the random-parameters should be equal to zero.
The results from the random coeﬃcients model diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the random-
eﬀects model in a number of important ways. As expected, both models predict that the
value of imports has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood that the country will
make an aﬃrmative injury determination. Speciﬁcally, the results suggest that a 10 percent
increase in the value of imports from the country under investigation increases the likelihood
of an aﬃrmative determination by 0.17 percentage points. However, the estimated standard
deviation of this parameter in the random-coeﬃcient model is also signiﬁcant, suggesting
that the marginal eﬀect of imports on the probability of an aﬃrmative determination varies
signiﬁcantly across countries and industries. Similarly, both models ﬁnd that the average
29Please see the appendix for a description of the calculation of the average marginal eﬀects and their
standard errors.
30In other words, the random-eﬀects probit model can be thought of as a restricted version of the random-
coeﬃcients probit model in which only the constant term is allowed to vary across countries and industries.
18impact of the importer’s GDP growth on the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination
is statistically insigniﬁcant. However, the estimated standard deviation on this parameter
from the random-coeﬃcient model is quite large and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that
this macroeconomic variable may play a more important role in investigations conducted by
some importing countries.
Although theoretically the likelihood of ﬁnding evidence that dumped imports have in-
jured the domestic industry should fall as the industry increases its output, the results from
the random-eﬀects probit model suggest that production growth has a positive and signiﬁ-
cant impact on the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination.31 The random-eﬀects
model predicts that a one percentage point change in the industry’s production growth will
result in a 0.40 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an aﬃrmative determination.
The estimates from the random-coeﬃcients probit model help to explain this counter-
intuitive result. As Table [4] shows, the parameters from this model suggest instead that
the average impact of the production growth in the industry is statistically indistinguish-
able from zero, but this impact varies signiﬁcantly across countries and industries. While
investigations involving certain importing countries and industries are more likely to result
in the imposition of duties as industrial production increases, investigations involving other
importing countries and industries are less likely to result in duties when faced with the
same conditions in the domestic industry.
Figure [2] graphs a kernel density estimation of the country-industry speciﬁc marginal
eﬀect of the industry’s production growth on the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determi-
nation.32 The dotted line graphs the density of the parameter from the random-eﬀects model,
while the solid line graphs the density of the estimated country/industry speciﬁc parame-
ters from the random-coeﬃcients model. Although the results from the random-coeﬃcients
model make more intuitive sense than the results from the baseline model, it is still puzzling
why some countries would be more likely to ﬁnd that the domestic industry has been injured
by dumped imports when production growth in the industry increases. This may be a sign
31This result does not seem to be caused by collinearity between the industry’s production growth and
other variables in the model such as the importing country’s GDP growth or GDP per capita. Results from
models excluding these variables were virtually identical to those discussed here.
32Please see the Appendix for a description of these calculations.
19that countries want to protect high-growth industries to ensure continued success.
The parameter estimates associated with the non-random parameters are virtually iden-
tical in both the random-eﬀects and random-coeﬃcients models. For example, the results
indicate that antidumping petitions are marginally less likely to be successful the higher
the income of the country under investigation as hypothesized. A $1,000 increase in the
exporting country’s GDP per capita reduces the likelihood of an aﬃrmative determination
by about 0.2 percentage points.
I ﬁnd that a one percent appreciation of the exporting country’s currency decreases the
likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination by 0.14 percent. This result is seemingly
counter to the results in both Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2005), which ﬁnd that
countries are more likely to ﬁle a petition following a real appreciation of the importing coun-
try’s currency. Both authors attribute this to the fact that the real appreciation increases the
likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination. Theoretically, however, a real appreciation
can either increase or decrease the probability of an aﬃrmative injury determination.
As described in Knetter and Prusa (2003), a depreciation of the exporting country’s
currency will cause its marginal costs, as measured in the importing country’s currency, to
fall. Under exchange rate pass through theory, this will typically cause the exporting industry
to lower its price in the importing country. The domestic industry will then be forced to
either lower its price or lose market share, causing its proﬁts to fall and increasing the
likelihood that their government will make an aﬃrmative injury determination. However, if
the foreign industry reduces its price by less than the exchange rate depreciation, or engages
in incomplete pass-through, it has actually increased its export price as measured in the
foreign currency; this relative price increase should reduce the dumping margin determination
by the importing country. To the extent that the government takes into account the dumping
margin in the injury determination, the depreciation of the exporting country’s currency will
decrease the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination.
In contrast to Feinberg (2005) and Knetter and Prusa (2003), Feinberg (1989) ﬁnds that
countries are less likely to ﬁle a petition following a real appreciation, which he attributes to
the fact that the appreciation typically causes dumping margins to be lower. It seems from
the results of this sample that on average the negative impact of the lower dumping margin
20on the probability of an aﬃrmative injury determination more than oﬀsets any increase
in this probability that occurs because the appreciation makes domestic ﬁrms worse oﬀ as
imports increase.
One might expect that a weak foreign economy would prompt the foreign industry to
lower its export prices in an eﬀort to increase exports and maintain its total production in
the face of lower domestic sales. If this was the case, the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury
determination should be negatively related to the growth in the exporting country’s GDP.
This hypothesis has been rejected by other empirical studies. Knetter and Prusa (2003), for
example, ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant relationship between world GDP growth and the number of
antidumping petitions ﬁled. The results from both the random-eﬀects and random-coeﬃcient
models instead indicate that a one percentage point increase in the exporting country’s GDP
growth rate increases the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination by about 0.3
percentage points.
Other variables that have been shown in the past to be signiﬁcant are statistically insignif-
icant in this sample of 12 countries. For example, none of the political variables, including
the industry’s share of employment, the industry’s share of GDP and the industry’s tariﬀ
rate, are statistically signiﬁcant. The level of development of the importing country also
has no signiﬁcant impact on the probability of an aﬃrmative injury determination. The in-
signiﬁcance may actually be another sign of heterogeneity in the methods used to determine
injury across countries. Although these variables have been shown in other studies to be
signiﬁcant in decisions by individual countries such as the United States, the average impact
of the variables across the 12 sampled countries is insigniﬁcant.33
5.1 Variance Across Countries
In the second speciﬁcation presented in Table [4], I attempt to explain part of the esti-
mated variance of the random coeﬃcients using country-speciﬁc characteristics. Speciﬁcally,
I allow the random-parameters to vary according to whether the investigating country is a
33For example, the estimates from the estimation of the random-eﬀects model limited to the United States
indicate that the tariﬀ rate has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury
determination.
21developing country. Because the traditional users of antidumping regulations are all high-
income countries, developing countries tend to have less experience undertaking antidumping
investigations. Developing countries may also have less access to current, reliable economic
data, and have fewer resources to devote to the investigation. Based on the likelihood ratio
statistic reported in Table [4], I reject the null hypothesis that the average values of the
random parameters are equal across developing and high-income countries as assumed in
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation reported in the Table.
The results suggest a number of interesting diﬀerences in the determinants of injury in-
vestigations in developing and high-income countries. For example, allowing the average
value of the random-coeﬃcients to vary according to the level of development of the inves-
tigating country signiﬁcantly changes the marginal impact of some of the ﬁxed parameters.
Although the investigating country’s GDP per capita was statistically insigniﬁcant in pre-
vious speciﬁcations, this characteristic has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the likelihood
of an aﬃrmative injury determination once the value of the random-coeﬃcients are allowed
to vary by level of development. Note that in this speciﬁcation the constant term is also
allowed to vary by level of development. In other words, the results indicate that conditional
on whether the country is deﬁned as a “developing” or “high-income” country, the likelihood
of an aﬃrmative injury determination decreases with the investigating country’s GDP per
capita.
The average value of the random-coeﬃcient associated with the industry’s share of GDP is
insigniﬁcant for both developing and high-income countries, as it was when the average value
was assumed to be the same across both groups of countries. However, when this average
value is allowed to vary across the level of income of the investigating country, the standard
error becomes much larger and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that political factors
such as the relative economic importance of the industry can sometimes play a signiﬁcant
role in injury determinations, as found in earlier studies.
Parameter values associated with the impact of the value of imports on the likelihood
of an aﬃrmative injury determination indicate that the entire variance across countries and
industries can be explained by the level of development of the investigating country. Once the
average impact of imports is allowed to diﬀer across developing and high-income countries,
22the standard deviation on the random parameter becomes insigniﬁcant. Figure [3] graphs
the kernel density estimates of the country-industry speciﬁc marginal impact of log (imports)
on the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination. The graph clearly shows that the
marginal impact of imports is always higher in high-income countries than in developing
countries. Speciﬁcally, a 10 percent increase in imports results in a 0.29 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of an aﬃrmative determination in high-income countries, but a
statistically insigniﬁcant increase in developing countries.
Recall that the impact of the exporter’s share of industry imports proved to be statis-
tically insigniﬁcant in earlier speciﬁcations. The results when the random-coeﬃcients are
allowed to vary according to level of development instead suggest that the share of imports
also has a statistically signiﬁcant, positive impact on the likelihood that a country will make
an aﬃrmative injury determination.
5.2 Variance Across Industries
I also investigate whether the variance in the random-coeﬃcients can be explained by
industry-speciﬁc characteristics. For example, a number of authors have hypothesized that
current antidumping regulations may result in the imposition of higher levels of protection
on agricultural products than manufactured goods due to the unique characteristics of the
agriculture industry.34 These authors note that many agricultural commodities’ prices and
output ﬂuctuate in cycles that often last more than the two or three years typically used in
the government’s calculation of injury and dumping. As a result, the government is almost
guaranteed to ﬁnd evidence of dumping and injury during periods of investigation that occur
during low-points in the cycle if they fail to take this cyclical nature into account. Unfortu-
nately, none of the industry-speciﬁc characteristics I have employed, including many of the
political explanatory variables included in this dataset, proved to be signiﬁcant determinants
of the random-parameters.
Attempts to allow the average random-parameter to vary according to whether the indus-
try under investigation was in the agricultural sector failed to converge within a reasonable
34For an overview of this literature, see Reynolds (2006).
23number of iterations.35 This does not necessarily prove, however, that current antidumping
regulations do not result in diﬀerent outcomes depending on whether the investigation in-
volves the agricultural sector. Note from Table [6] that the characteristics of the industries
ﬁling antidumping petitions in the manufactured sector are vastly diﬀerent from the char-
acteristics of industry’s ﬁling antidumping petitions in the agricultural sector. For example,
the industry’s share of GDP and employment, and the exporter’s share of industry imports,
are noticeably higher in cases involving the agriculture sector than other cases. Similarly, the
average industry’s production growth is noticeably lower in cases involving the agriculture
sector than in the manufacturing sector.
These diﬀerences in the explanatory variables can have a dramatically diﬀerent impact
on the predicted outcomes of antidumping investigations. For example, Figure [6] graphs
the average predicted probability of an aﬃrmative injury determination in investigations
involving manufactured and agricultural products as the industry’s production growth in-
creases using the estimates of the random-coeﬃcients model.36 As noted before, the average
marginal impact of the industry’s production growth is indistinguishable from zero in the full
sample, resulting in the virtually ﬂat predicted probability curve for the full-sample as well
as the sub-sample of manufactured goods. However, the graph of the predicted probabil-
ity for the agricultural sector shows a distinct negative impact of the industry’s production
growth on the likelihood of an aﬃrmative injury determination as might be expected based
on current antidumping regulations.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the diﬀerences in the determinants of antidumping injury investiga-
tions across countries and industries. Although one might expect that these determinants
should be fairly consistent across countries under the World Trade Organization’s Antidump-
ing Agreement, the results instead reveal a number of signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For example,
35This could be due to the fact that there are too few investigations involving agricultural products within
the sample to identify a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the determinants of injury investigations involving
manufactured versus agricultural products.
36Please see the Appendix for a description of how these calculations were made.
24while some countries are less likely to make an aﬃrmative injury determination as the indus-
try’s production growth or the country’s GDP growth rate increases, production growth and
health of the domestic economy are positively correlated with the probability of an aﬃrma-
tive injury determination in other countries. Similarly, the value of imports from the country
under investigation has a much higher impact on the likelihood of success in high-income
countries than in developing countries.
The results have important implications both for future research on the outcomes of
antidumping investigations and for future WTO negotiations on antidumping regulations.
Future researchers should take into consideration the fact that estimated average parameters
or marginal eﬀects may mask signiﬁcant diﬀerences across countries and industries. If mem-
bers of the WTO value consistency in antidumping determinations across countries, they
should consider whether more stringent regulations are needed in the WTO’s Antidumping
Agreement.
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28A Appendix: Calculation of Average Marginal Eﬀects
This appendix describes the calculation of the average marginal eﬀects and their standard
errors reported in Table [5] and used in the kernel density estimation illustrated in Figures
[2] and [3]. These average eﬀects and their standard errors are also used in the calculation
of the predicted probabilities illustrated in Figure [6]. The methodology employed is similar
to one suggested in Train [2003].
Deﬁne b θ as the estimate of the vector of parameters of the model (β,γ,δ,Γ) and b Σ as the
asymptotic covariance matrix of these estimates. To estimate the average marginal impact
of the explanatory variables, Ψci, on the likelihood that country c will make an aﬃrmative
injury determination in a case ﬁled by industry i, the following steps are taken:
1. Draw a vector of parameters from the distribution of b θ. Speciﬁcally, draw a vector of
K standard normal errors, ηs, where K is the number of parameters in the model. The
draw of parameters is:
θ
s = b θ + Wη
s
where W is the Choleski factor of b Σ.
2. Calculate the average marginal eﬀect for each country-industry combination. Note
























svci, vci ∼ N(0,1)
However, as noted before this integral cannot be calculated analytically. Instead,
the average marginal eﬀect must be similated as in the similation of the likelihood






























ci is the log likelihood contribution for country c and industry i associated
with the rth draw of γs
ci.
293. Repeat steps 1 and 2 S times. The average of Ψs
ci over the s draws of b θ is the mean
marginal eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the injury determination of country c in
a petition ﬁled by industry i. These country-industry speciﬁc average marginal eﬀects
are used in the kernel density estimation illustrated in Figures[2] and [3].
Note that this methodology involves a simulation within a simulation. The average marginal
eﬀects and associated standard errors reported in Table [5] are the average of these country-
industry speciﬁc average marginal eﬀects over either the full sample or the developing country
and high-income country sub-samples. The standard errors account for both the sampling
variance in the estimated population parameters associated with Σ as well as the standard
deviation of the individual’s marginal eﬀects from the population average, which is closely
tied to the estimated parameters in Γ.
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Antidumping Injury Decisions by Industry, 1995-2003
Total Percent Percent
ISIC Industry Investigations Aﬃrmative Negative
110 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 20 55 45
210 Mining 1 100 0
311 Food Manufacturing 62 63 37
313 Beverage Manufacturing 1 100 0
321 Textiles 60 90 10
322 Apparel 24 0 100
323 Leather Products 3 100 0
324 Footwear 16 56 44
331 Wood Products 9 89 11
332 Furniture and Fixtures 2 100 0
341 Paper products 71 56 44
342 Printing and Publishing 8 50 50
351 Industrial Chemicals 495 73 27
352 Other Chemical Products 21 90 10
353 Petroleum Reﬁneries 2 100 0
354 Petroleum and Coal Products 6 67 33
355 Rubber Products 49 76 24
356 Plastic Products 9 100 0
361 Pottery and China 3 100 0
362 Glass Products 20 45 55
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 25 44 66
371 Iron and Steel 478 68 32
372 Non-ferrous Metal 24 75 25
381 Fabricated Metal Products 59 88 12
382 Non-electrical Machinery 66 62 38
383 Electrical Machinery 75 72 28
384 Transport Equipment 19 63 37
385 Professional and Scientiﬁc Equipment 24 58 42
390 Other Manufactured Goods 18 67 33
35Table 2:
Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Error Min. Max.
Full Sample
Injury 0.689 0.011 0.000 1.000
Importers’s GDP Growth 0.068 0.001 -0.160 0.202
Log(Imports) 8.588 0.065 0.000 15.851
Production Growth 0.025 0.002 -0.693 0.940
Industry’s Share of GDP 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.255
Exporter’s GDP per Capita 10.450 0.280 0.245 45.206
Importer’s GDP per Capita 13.694 0.303 0.370 36.789
Exchange Rate Change 0.050 0.004 -0.849 1.002
Exporter’s GDP Growth 0.074 0.002 -0.390 0.327
Exporter’s Share of Imports 0.148 0.005 0.000 1.000
Industry’s Share of Employment 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.261
Tariﬀ 0.132 0.003 0.006 0.400
No. of Obs. 1,671
Developing High-Income
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Injury 0.748 0.015 0.628 0.017
Importers’s GDP Growth 0.072 0.002 0.065 0.001
Log(Imports) 7.627 0.088 9.588 0.084
Production Growth 0.031 0.004 0.020 0.002
Industry’s Share of GDP 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.001
Exporter’s GDP per Capita 11.265 0.403 9.603 0.388
Importer’s GDP per Capita 2.903 0.951 24.921 0.269
Exchange Rate Change 0.074 0.008 0.256 0.005
Exporter’s GDP Growth 0.076 0.002 0.072 0.003
Exporter’s Share of Imports 0.166 0.007 0.129 0.006
Industry’s Share of Employment 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.001
Tariﬀ 0.218 0.003 0.004 0.001
No. of Obs. 852 819
36Table 3:
Determinants of Antidumping Injury Decisions, 1995-2003
Random Eﬀects Probit Model
Parameter Estimate Marginal Eﬀect
Importer’s GDP Growth -1.311 -0.364
(1.205) (0.335)
Log(Imports) 0.064* 0.017*
(Imports in thousands) (0.018) (0.007)
Production Growth 1.448* 0.401*
(0.559) (0.196)
Industry’s Share of GDP 0.810 0.225
(0.720) (2.524)
Exporter’s GDP per Capita -0.009* -0.002*
(in thousands) (0.004) (0.001)
Importer’s GDP per Capita -0.013 -0.036
(in thousands) (0.011) (0.034)
Exchange Rate Change -0.522* -0.144*
(0.198) (0.074)
Exporter’s GDP Growth 0.988** 0.274
(0.549) (0.182)
Exporter’s Share of Industry Imports 0.352 0.097
(0.235) (0.070)










Number of Observations 1,671
Log Likelihood -897.767
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *,** indicate those parameters
signiﬁcant at the 5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively.
37Table 4:
Determinants of Antidumping Injury Decisions, 1995-2003
Random Coeﬃcients Probit Model
(1) (2)
Mean γ Std. Error Mean γ Std. Error
Importer’s GDP Growth -1.642 6.544* -4.607 7.702*
(1.558) (1.150) (3.396) (1.188)
* Developing 3.285
(3.814)
Log(Imports) 0.064* 0.018* 0.101* 0.002
(Imports in thousands) (0.019) (0.009) (0.025) (0.012)
* Developing -0.085*
(0.034)
Production Growth -.057 4.704* 1.462 4.794*
(1.107) (1.276) (1.645) (1.183)
* Developing -1.007
(1.973)
Industry’s Share of GDP 2.890 7.780 -4.960 18.750*
(9.490) (10.920) (13.070) (7.220)
* Developing 0.540
(18.220)
Exporter’s GDP per Capita -0.010* -0.011*
(in thousands) (0.004) (0.004)
Importer’s GDP per Capita -0.009 -0.004*
(in thousands) (0.009) (0.001)
Exchange Rate Change -0.444* -0.402**
(0.216) (0.217)
Exporter’s GDP Growth 1.202* 1.312*
(0.576) (0.584)
Exporter’s Share of Industry 0.394 0.531*
Imports (0.245) (0.242)




* Developing 2.038 3.576
(2.465) (2.950)
Constant -0.222 0.658* 0.303 0.461*
(0.287) (0.082) (0.462) (0.068)
Developing -0.260
(0.462)
Number of Observations 1,671 1,671
Log Likelihood -883.497 -874.249
L.R. Test Statistic 28.542 18.494
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *,** indicate those parameters
signiﬁcant at the 5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance level, respectively.
38Table 5:
Marginal Eﬀects from Random Coeﬃcients Probit Model
(1) (2)
Full Sample Developing Higher Income
Importer’s GDP Growth -0.581 -0.612 -1.468
(0.876) (1.141) (1.407)
Log(Imports) 0.016* 0.004 0.029*
(Imports in thousands) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Production Growth 0.018 0.123 0.421
(0.599) (0.714) (0.656)
Industry’s Share of GDP 0.650 -1.310 -1.600
(2.800) (3.950) (4.380)
Exporter’s GDP per Capita -0.003* -0.003** -0.003*
(in thousands) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Importer’s GDP per Capita -0.002 -0.008** -0.010*
(in thousands) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Exchange Rate Change -0.115* -0.095 -0.117
(0.075) (0.069) (0.072)
Exporter’s GDP Growth 0.310* 0.310* 0.382*
(0.185) (0.187) (0.182)
Exporter’s Share of Industry 0.101 0.125 0.154**
Imports (0.076) (0.081) (0.081)
Industry’s Share of Employment 0.030 0.500 0.620
(1.660) (1.640) (1.910)
Tariﬀ 0.658 0.941 0.114
(0.630) (0.537) (0.719)
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *,** indicate those parameters




Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Injury 0.691 0.011 0.550 0.114
Importers’s GDP Growth 0.068 0.001 0.066 0.001
Log(Imports) 8.554 0.065 11.334 0.296
Production Growth 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.012
Industry’s Share of GDP 0.009 0.002 0.037 0.012
Exporter’s GDP per Capita 10.431 0.282 12.048 2.958
Importer’s GDP per Capita 13.554 0.304 25.292 2.717
Exchange Rate Change 0.051 0.005 -0.014 0.023
Exporter’s GDP Growth 0.074 0.002 0.097 0.012
Exporter’s Share of Imports 0.145 0.005 0.458 0.078
Industry’s Share of Employment 0.007 0.002 0.066 0.018
Tariﬀ 0.131 0.003 0.163 0.002
No. of Obs. 20 1,651
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